Filoviruses
These viruses are filamentous in structure and are therefore known as filoviruses. Infections with these viruses have a very high case-fatality ratio. Fortunately, infections are not common, but if they occur, they tend to be dramatic.
In 1967 there was an epidemic of Marburg virus infection among laboratory staff in Marburg, Germany. These people worked with African green monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops), imported from Uganda. Some people in Frankfurt and Belgrade, Yugoslavia, who came into contact with the same batch of animals also fell ill. In all 32 people were affected : 26 primary infections and 6 secondary infections. The mortality rate of the primary infections was 25%. In the next few years a number of sporadic cases were seen in Zimbabwe (’75), Kenya (’80 and ’87) and a laboratory infection in Russia (’87). In 1999 and 2000 multiple cases were diagnosed in the north east of Congo, in the area of Durba. These were mainly gold prospectors working in very primitive conditions in old mines. There had probably already been a low level of transmission in this area for some considerable time (years). Local research was hindered by social unrest and armed conflicts in the area. The natural reservoir of Marburg virus is unknown, but is is tempting to speculate on a reservoir host which is somehow connected with underground mines. A number of subtypes are recognised Ravn, Musoki, Popp. There are very probably other subtypes as well. There is no vaccine and no effective treatment.
In 1976 there was a sudden large-scale epidemic of 2 different Ebola viruses in Maridi (South Sudan) and in Yambuku, on the Ebola river in North Congo. The mortality rate in Yambuku was very high (280 deaths out of 318 cases = 88%) and slightly lower in Sudan (53%). In 1977 there was one fatal case in Tandala, North Congo. New major outbreaks occurred in 1979 in Nzara (South Sudan), in 1995 in Kikwit, Congo and in 2003 in Kelle, Congo Brazzaville. The virus, which emerged in Kikwit, very closely resembled that in Yambuku (less than 1.6% difference in RNA, which is very little). This is a sign of a genome which is not under selection pressure, suggesting a stable ecological niche between epidemics. The Sudanese virus isolates of 1976 and 1979 were also almost identical.
In December 1994, 44 people were infected in Minkouka (northeast Gabon). In February 1996, 37 people were infected with Ebola virus in the isolated village of Mayibout, in the same area on the Ivindo river. In this case it was suspected that people were infected after eating infected chimpanzee meat. In October 1996 a similar outbreak was seen in Gabon in Booué and then in Makokou. There were approximately 60 cases. An infected doctor was flown over to South Africa and there caused a fatal secondary case in a nurse. This illustrates how easily pathogenic organisms can be spread in this age of rapid transport. The Gabonese virus isolates were identical to those in Congo. Asymptomatic infections occurred in Gabon in a number of people. In the autumn of 2000 there was a large scale epidemic of Ebola-Sudan in Gulu in the north of Uganda. After this there were cases in other districts (Masindi, Mbarara). There were 425 cases with 224 deaths. In December 2001-January 2002 numerous cases were reported in Gabon and in neighbouring Congo. Multiple cases emerged again in April 2002 in Gabon. Early in 2003, a large scale epidemic occurred in Mbomo and Kelle, a very remote and rural area of Congo Brazzaville, just south of Odzala National Park. It started by a large scale die-off among the lowland gorillas in the park. The disease flared up again in the same area, in November the same year, but was contained before New Year 2004. In May 2004, Ebola haemorrhagic fever appeared again in Sudan, in the area of Yambio.
Transmission takes place through direct contact with infected body fluids (including sexual contact) and nosocomially through infected needles and contact with infected blood. Aerogenic transmission of Ebola has been demonstrated in the laboratory in Rhesus monkeys. The natural reservoir of these viruses is unknown. The monkey species which have been studied thus far all die from the infection and therefore cannot form the natural reservoir. Contact with infected monkeys plays a role in the beginning of an epidemic but how these animals are initially infected is not known. The epidemic which started in November 2003 in Mbomo, Congo Brazzaville, was rumoured to have started after villagers found a dead wild pig in the forest and ate its meat. This would be the first case that such an animal would be implicated. Certain fructivorous and insectivorous bats can be experimentally infected and certain species are seropositive in nature. These animals develop an asymptomatic infection. The viral genome has been detected by PCR in certain small rodents in the Central African Republic. These results could not be confirmed. Viral antigens could not be found nor was the virus ever cultured from these animals. The reliability of these PCR results is open to question. Structures, which may well have been viral nucleocapsids, were seen with the electron microscope in spleen cells in some animals. The animals belonged to two genera of rodents (Muridae; Mus setulosus and Praomys sp.) and one species of shrew (Soricidae; Sylvisorex ollula). Probably these leads were red herrings.
Recognition
The very first step is to recognise possible clinical cases. Steps should be taken to identify and type the virus (send a blood sample safely to a well-equipped laboratory). In a laboratory which is protected and equipped to work with dangerous pathogens (so-called biosafety level 4), an attempt will be made to detect viral antigen, antibodies and viral RNA (reverse transcriptase PCR) and carry out an analysis of the genome in order to establish which Ebola subtype is involved.
Central organisation
If it is established that it really is Ebola, the government will be notified. Central control, registration and coordination is essential for combating an epidemic. Groups specifically responsible for a certain part of the campaign will be set up: clinical care, surveillance in the community, logistics, collecting the dead and safe burials, investigating rumours, informing the population, epidemiological study, research, reception centre, etc. These days it is also useful to appoint someone who can handle the press correctly. Every day information will be exchanged between the various teams and the latest developments will be reported to the WHO in Geneva.
Isolating patients
The patients' movements should be limited. They should be isolated (no direct physical contact with patients, blood, excreta etc.). New patients must be directed to an emergency unit. Here, based on the history (contact with Ebola patients, fever, haemorrhagic symptoms) and a physical examination (melena, red eyes, haemorrhages), new patients must be divided into Ebola patients, non-Ebola patients and cases where there is doubt. Ebola cases must be kept in isolation. Cases where there is doubt should be kept elsewhere for observation (also in isolation). Often contact with Ebola will not be reported due to superstition, fear of stigmatization or if there was sexual contact with a person who subsequently developed Ebola infection. The absence of a rapid antigen detection test on-site can be a practical problem for the clinicians working in the field.
Barrier nursing
Personal protection (masks, goggles, aprons, boots, disinfection supplies) for medical staff and for people who care for the sick person (often family) is necessary. Demonstration of how to use the protective equipment and proper explanation are imperative. Equipment should be disinfected rigorously with, for example, bleach (hypochlorite solution). Objects, which cannot be sterilised, must be burnt under supervision. People who are suspected of being infected with the Ebola virus should be cared for by people who understand and use personal protection. Basic needs (drink, food, pain-relief, hygiene, etc.) have to be met. In emerging situations, when the medical staff is overwhelmed, only one member of the family should be allowed into the patient's room, and then only after thorough instructions and regular supervision.
Ebola Treatment
Since there are no known active antivirals against Ebola virus, treatment will be symptomatic. In all epidemics so far, treatment was done in very basic circumstances and treatment in an intensive care unit was not possible. During epidemics, good nursing care might lower the mortality. Good hydration and nutrition is essential. High calory liquid food is easier to swallow that solid food, due to severe pain in the throat. Complications and other infections will be treated, e.g. metoclopramide (Primperan) or domperidon (Motilium) against vomiting, loperamide against diarrhoea, ranitidine against gastric bleeding. Paracetamol, ampicillin and quinine or another antimalarial will be given if bacterial surinfection and/or malaria are suspected. Chlorpromazine and even haloperidol might be considered in case of agitated confusion. Vomitus, sputum, faeces and urine will be collected in a plastic bucket and mixed with strong bleach before disposal. Aspirin is to be avoided. Rehydratation is important.
Surveillance
People who have recently had contact with Ebola patients but do not display symptoms have to be placed under supervision (surveillance) or in quarantine for 3 weeks. If this does not take place in a hospital, but at home, daily (radio) contact is desirable.
Convalescent patients
People who have survived Ebola have to remain in quarantine for a further 3 weeks after recovery. It is not known how long the virus continues to be excreted. Sexual transmission is possible up to 7 weeks after clinical recovery. Convalescent serum can be stored if necessary, but its use is controversial. Animal studies have been unable to prove any benefit of hyperimmune serum.
Information
A general large-scale information campaign with adequate and practical information for the population should be started. If this results in many questions and tips, a permanent centre can be set up where information about possible new cases can be examined. In view of the extreme virulence, the incomplete knowledge about these pathogens and memories of the impact of the earlier plague and yellow fever epidemics, these pathogens can capture the imagination of the general public. Superstition and belief in witchcraft can lead to misunderstandings and violence.
Nosocomial transmission
Centres with a poor medical infrastructure and with a high risk of nosocomial transmission, have to be closed down temporarily. This applies both to large hospitals and small one-person clinics with only a few needles and syringes. Strict guidelines have to be issued to centres which continue functioning, particularly as regards disinfection, the use of needles and syringes, vaccinations and surgical procedures. In many places non-qualified private individuals have only a few (non-sterile) needles and syringes, which they use for all kinds of injections.
Burials
The deceased should not be washed and the bodies have to be isolated and buried as quickly as possible and reasonable. This sometimes causes problems with the family and acquaintances of the deceased because of the disruption of traditional rituals. The government has a role to play here in law enforcement. It is also useful to have an idea of the average mortality in an area prior to the Ebola outbreak.
Social impact
Caring for orphans in the community should be organised if this does not take place through the traditional system of the extended family. The latter sometimes does not work because of fear, prejudice and practical problems.
Logistics
Logistics play a very important role and include, among other things, equipment and materials, administrative support, accommodation, money and wages, communication, transport, fuel, safety and stock management. Good management is essential and has to be entrusted to reliable people. The NGO Médecins Sans Frontières has a lot of experience in handling the logistics of such operations.
Personnel
Experts in various areas cannot, in most cases, make themselves available quickly for a long time and a rotation system should be organized. It is best if staff do not change too frequently in order to achieve a minimal continuity locally. Realistic guidelines for cases in which medical personnel are infected accidentally have to be drawn up.
Epidemiology
Epidemiological research should attempt to identify transmission routes and secondary cases. One of the first questions which has to be answered is whether the course of the epidemic suggests aerogenic transmission or not. Risk factors for infection should be identified. An attempt will also be made to trace the first case in order to understand how the chain of infection started. However, this person may well have died. Several people, such as customers, work colleagues, neighbours, family and friends may be able to provide useful information. A reminder of the terminology: the index case is the patient in whom the disease first indicated the existence of an outbreak. The index patient always remains the same person irrespective of whether earlier cases are discovered later. The very first case is called the primary case, not the index case. Later secondary, tertiary, etc. cases can follow.
Reservoir
Because an animal reservoir is assumed, extensive attempts have been and are being made to identify this. An “ecological” team should be exclusively involved in this and will study different animals in the vicinity. An investigation should also be carried out into whether the virus is “exported” from the isolation units in the hospital to the environment. In addition to the fieldwork itself, there then follows the tedious analysis of the various potential hosts (both for the presence of the virus and their taxonomic identification). If new, more powerful and sensitive test methods are developed, samples from earlier field expeditions can, if necessary, be reexamined. A detailed description of the ecological/botanical environment in which the primary case emerged could be useful. As cases occurred in the Tai National Park in Côte d’Ivoire, where an ethological study of chimpanzees had been going on for years, this became a starting point for research. To date the analysis of the numerous arthropods and vertebrates has not produced a single positive viral isolate, but antibodies against Ebola virus have been found in fructivorous bats. It was discovered that the Ebola glycoproteins which make up the "shell" of the virus are chemically and structurally very similar to those found in several bird retroviruses. This suggests that birds might be implicated in the transmission of illness. At this moment, this is still hypothetical.
Laboratory
Rapid sample analysis (blood samples of patients, skin biopsies, etc.) and rapid transmission of the results is recommended. Logistical problems can hinder this. Investment in research and cooperation will pay dividends.
Looking for isolated cases
The maximum known incubation period is 21 days. After the end of the epidemic (no more cases for a minimum of 6 weeks), surveillance can be carried out locally. It is extremely likely that isolated cases and limited outbreaks will occur regularly. In order to obtain a better understanding of this disease, long-term surveillance is necessary. This can be done by analysing skin biopsies (immunohistochemistry) from deceased people who had suggestive symptoms before death. These biopsies could be performed and collected by locally trained doctors. The technique has the great advantages of being simple and having high sensitivity. No cold chain is necessary and transportation can take place safely. The sample is kept in a bottle of formalin. This kills the virus. The bottle is then immersed in a bleach solution in order to disinfect the exterior. The same technique is under evaluation for future monitoring of other haemorrhagic diseases with fever (e.g. yellow fever).
Future prevention
We do not know how all epidemics started, but several followed the consumption of infected apes. The risk of nosocomial transmission is clear. A safe medical infrastructure has to be built for the future. This is easier said than done. Naturally this does not only apply to Ebola, but to the whole spectrum of medicine. The cases of Ebola fever in South Africa and Switzerland show that the virus can emerge anywhere in the world, owing to modern rapid means of transportation.
Vaccine
At the end of 2000, the first favourable results of an experimental vaccine were reported in which cynomolgus monkeys (Macaca fascicularis) were protected against a fatal dose of Ebola virus, the Mayinga strain. An immunisation technique was used which was based on viral DNA injection followed by multiple boosters with a modified adenoviral vector. However, the vaccination regime took several months to produce immunity. In August 2003, Gary Nabel of the Vaccine Research Center at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases in Bethesda, Maryland announced the results of a new trial. Cynomolgus monkeys were protected 28 days after a single injection of a modified adenovirus in which parts of the Ebola genome coding for nucleoprotein and glycoprotein were inserted. How long the protection lasts is not known at present and it is also not known if there is protection against other Ebola subtypes. If similar promising results with a one-shot vaccine would be obtained in humans, fast ring vaccination would become possible in case of a new outbreak. Adenoviruses are common human pathogens (e.g. common cold) and many people have anti-adenoviral antibodies in their blood. If this will interfere with this vaccination technique is not yet known. The use of alternative adenoviral serotypes might be useful if this would prove to be the case. Another vaccine is based on a modified animal pathogen, the vesicular stomatitis virus. When VSV's glycoprotein-gene was replaced by that of Ebola, the resulting virus protected animals against lethal Ebola challenge. However, VSV can occasionally provoke disease in humans, so there is some uncertainty about the safety of such an approach.
Tourists with respiratory problems are likely to have a cosmopolitan illness. Sometimes an exotic disease will be responsible. Remember that typhoid fever often begins with cough and fever, but there will be no stomatitis or pharyngitis. It should be determined whether:
the disease is acute or chronic
whether the patient is febrile or afebrile
whether there is eosinophilia or not
whether the condition concerns the upper or the lower airways
In cases of severe inflammation or soreness of the throat one should suspect:
Viral infections, which are the most frequent.
Herpangina (Coxsackie virus). This viral infection causes typical lesions on the soft palate.
Mononucleosis. Often a typical blood picture. Serology carried out on paired sera or detection of IgM will confirm the diagnosis. Mild splenomegaly can occur.
Mycoplasma pneumoniae infections are cosmopolitan.
Gonococcal pharyngitis occasionally causes moderate sore throat. Cultures are essential. The partner(s) should likewise be treated.
Streptococcal angina ("strep throat"). There is a risk of acute rheumatic fever and glomerulonephritis. These complications still occurs frequently in tropical areas.
Plaut-Vincent angina, caused by infection with Borrelia vincenti, in association with fusobacteria. Penicillin with metronidazole form the preferred therapy.
Quinsy (paratonsillar abscess) is usually caused by streptococci or by anaerobic bacteria. It is a medical emergency because of the danger of asphyxiation. Drainage of the pus is imperative.
Diphtheria. Corynebacterium diphtheriae. Pharyngeal diphtheria with cardiac and neurological problems is a very serious disease. There is substantial lymphadenopathy. The incidence of the disease increased greatly during the 1990s in the countries of the former Soviet Union.
Lassa and Ebola fever. Rare. Sore throat, fever and haemorrhagic tendency are present. These diseases are very rare but are included in the differential diagnosis in tourists from Africa.
Oropharyngeal anthrax, tularaemia and plague are rare. There is local necrosis and regional lymphadenopathy. Treatment with high doses of penicillin (anthrax), streptomycine (plague) or other antibiotic regimens.
Agranulocytosis, e.g. after use of amodiaquine or chloramphenicol. A blood test is essential and suggests the diagnosis; a bone marrow biopsy will confirm aplasia.
In aphthous stomatitis, the use of paludrine (proguanil) should be determined. Malarone contains proguanil.
It should be borne in mind that secondary syphilis can cause mucosal lesions.
Halzoun can mimic acute pharyngitis. Linguatula larvae migrate via the oesophagus into the throat, where they firmly attach themselves. Physical examination reveals the parasite.
Foreign bodies such as fish bones or chicken bones.
Noma is a dramatic occurrence, clinically obvious.
Multibacillary leprosy can be accompanied by oral / nasal lesions and hoarseness.
Do not forget neoplastic lesions as a cause of chronic ulcerations.
Behçet syndrome can provoke mucosal ulcerations.
Dysentery is a severe form of diarrhoea. Fever is common in bacillary dysentery, but rare in amoebic dysentery. Dysentery has three characteristics:
Abdominal pain
Tenesmus (pain due to cramps in the rectum) and false defecation need
Frequent evacuation of small quantities of faeces that are mixed with blood, mucus and/or pus
Steatorrhoea or fatty diarrhoea is characterised by large quantities of faeces with an increased fat content (the stools float on water). This occurs in certain malabsorption syndromes. The cause usually lies in disorders of the pancreas or small intestine.
The following list is not exhaustive:
Preformed toxins: produced by Staphylococcus aureus, Bacillus cereus, etc.
Viruses: Rota virus, Norwalk virus, Astrovirus, HIV, Noroviruses, …
Bacteria: Salmonella, Shigella, Yersinia, some Escherichia coli, toxicogenic Vibrio cholerae, Campylobacter jejuni, toxicogenic Clostridium difficile
Protozoa: Giardia, Entamoeba histolytica, Balantidium coli, microsporidia, various coccidia (Isospora belli, Cryptosporidia, Cyclospora, Sarcocystis). Sometimes by malaria as well!
Worms: only in case of serious infections, e.g. Schistosoma mansoni, Capillaria philippinensis, Strongyloides stercoralis, Trichinella spiralis; rarely by other worms. Since worm infections are so common in the tropics, worm eggs are often found in the stools. However, there is not necessarily an aetiological connection.
This is the picture of a bacillary dysentery. Pathogens are Shigella, Salmonella, Campylobacter and some Escherichia coli. Some bacteria are very aggressive, while others give rise to milder infections, for example Shigella dysenteriae , S. flexneri, S. boydii , S. sonnei. Complications can occur: toxic megacolon, recta, prolapse, septicaemia, haemolytic-uraemic syndrome (TTP-HUS, often triggered by Shiga toxin produced by Escherichia coli O157:H7 or other verotoxin producing bacteria (VTEC), reactive arthritis, Reiter’s syndrome [urethritis, arthritis, conjunctivitis, uveitis, hyperkeratosis of the palms of the hand (keratoderma blennorrhagicum) and painless ulcers in the mouth and on the glans (balanitis circinata)]. If HUS occurs, antibiotics are contraindicated because otherwise still more toxins are released from the bacteria that have been killed, which aggravate the clinical status. After using antibiotics an overgrowth of Clostridium difficile can occur in the intestine. The toxins that are produced by this bacterium can cause a severe inflammation of the colon (pseudomembranous colitis).
A very serious complication after Campylobacter enteritis is the Guillain-Barré syndrome, which is characterised by ascending paralysis caused by a demyelinating process of the spinal roots. Similarly there is Fischer's syndrome in which the cranial nerves are affected. The protein content of the cerebrospinal fluid is very high, but the fluid contains few cells. There are usually prodromata of headache, nausea, back pain and pain in the limbs. It can start very quickly with a progressively reducing strength in the legs and later in the arms. If the paralysis ascends to C3 (level of the phrenic nerve), paralysis of the diaphragm ensues. The seventh cranial nerve can also be affected. There are also sensory symptoms, but these are not prominent. Initially, treatment in an intensive care unit is necessary. The vital respiratory capacity must be monitored. Plasmapheresis and IV immunoglobulins (400 mg/kg/day x 5 days) are required. Steroids are no longer recommended. Most people make a full recovery, but this can take several months. In 10-20% of cases there are permanent neurological sequelae.
Guillain-Barré syndrome is due to an immunological process of molecular mimicry that is not fully understood. There is a connection with anti-GM1 IgG antibodies following Campylobacter jejuni enteritis. Infection by C. jejuni carrying GM1-like LPS induces a high production of anti-GM1 IgG antibodies. The autoantibodies bind GM1 that is present on the nodal axolemma of the motor nerve and block electrophysiological conduction. After this, macrophages, guided by the anti-GM1 IgG, enter the periaxonal space and degeneration of the motor axon follows.
In case of bacillary dysentery, examination of the faeces under the microscope shows numerous white blood cells (pus) and red blood cells. Bacillary dysentery is associated with a marked disappearance of the normal bacterial intestinal flora. It is not possible to distinguish between the different bacteria by microscopy alone (culture is needed for this). As always, fluid and electrolytes form the basis for treatment. With bacillary dysentery, antibiotics are an important part of therapy. The resistance of the various bacteria varies. Multi-resistant bacteria are becoming more common. Depending on the local conditions, cotrimoxazole, ampicillin or a quinolone (such as ofloxacin [Tarivid®]) should be used. The use of diarrhoea-inhibitors (loperamide) is not recommended.
| Diffusely adherent (DAEC) | Small intestine, watery diarrhoea |
| Enterohaemorrhagic (EHEC) | Colon, often bloody diarrhoea. In 10% complicated by HUS. Incubation 3-9 days |
| Enteroaggregative (EAggEC) | Small intestine. Watery mucoid diarrhoea (70%), bloody in 30%. Short incubation (8-18h) |
| Enteroinvasive (EIEC) | Distal ileum and colon. Watery diarrhoea, sometimes bloody. |
| Enteropathogenic (EPEC) | Proximal small intestine. Watery diarrhoea. Incubation 6-48h |
| Enterotoxicogenic (ETEC) | Small intestine, common. Watery diarrhoea. Incubation 14-30h. |